Solipsism Gradient

Rainer Brockerhoff’s blog

[Note for English-language readers: I describe a transient DNS poisoning attack against Banco do Brasil.]

Ontem, dia 4 de maio, em torno de 13:00 locais (17:00 GMT) entrei no site do Banco do Brasil. Na tela normal de login, tem-se que informar agência, conta e a senha de 8 dígitos. Feito isto, apareceu uma tela — inusitada! — solicitando, também, a senha de 6 dígitos!

Apesar da tela normal, com todos os logos etc. no lugar, desconfiei e olhei alguns dos links que saíam desta tela. Vários deles se dirigiam a um servidor, também, inusitado:  Fui verificar via whois:

owner:       BANCO DO BRASIL S.A.
ownerid:     000.000.000/0001-91

ou seja, aparentemente normal. Porém, mirando este servidor eu vi:

PING ( 56 data bytes
64 bytes from icmp_seq=0 ttl=48 time=1203.666 ms

um endereço que não me lembrava de ter visto para um site brasileiro. De fato:

inetnum: -
descr:          Dedicated servers
country:        LT
person:         Martynas Simkevicius
address:        Tilzes 74
address:        LT-76140 Siauliai

ou seja, um servidor localizado na Lituânia! Obviamente se tratava de um ataque “DNS Cache Poisoning” e isto, provavelmente, nos DNS da Vivo, meu provedor atual. Claro, não prossegui nas páginas nem tentei seguir os links; mas, com toda certeza, minha senha de 8 dígitos já tinha sido enviada ao impostor.

Vi outro relato possivelmente relacionado ao incidente nesta mensagem:
“Your connection is not secure…” e, depois, um erro na configuração SSL/certificados do servidor, que eu sabia ser um dos normalmente usados no internet banking do BB. Tentei acessar este servidor aqui, com o mesmo resultado.

relatos esporádicos de tais ataques contra o BB no passado, e muitos contra outros alvos.

Por precaução, fui imediatamente ao banco e alterei as minhas senhas — e, de fato, do terminal de lá conseguia acessar a conta normalmente. De volta, mudei para outro DNS e apaguei os caches; também, agora, tudo de volta ao normal aqui em casa.

You may have noticed the small lock icon next to the URL on this site? Well, this means that it’s now (almost) fully buzzword-compliant, completely served over the secure https protocol via a brand-new digital certificate! TL;DR: it’s more secure for both you and me; at least, it’s much better than it was before. But nobody’s perfect.

I know; some pages (perhaps, even, this blog post you’re reading) still haven’t adapted to our new secure overlords and may not show the lock icon, or even be completely broken — I’m working on that. In a week or two all should be fine. I’m using the invaluable checker for this, and already managed to get an A rating from the equally invaluable page. Credit to my hosting provider, DreamHost, for making this migration both possible and almost painless.

In other news, we’re just back from Yet Another Trip — this time to Patagonia and Antarctica. I’ve had plenty of time to work offline, meaning that things which are sometimes fascinating but often boring got done without excuses; I had to push off procrastination for weeks! In another week or two — or a month or two, if Zeno’s Paradox kicks in — a new RB Utility should be available. The app itself is 95% done, but as I plan to release it on both the Mac App Store and from this site, and it’s a paid app, all the tedious back-end stuff had to be learned and developed. Watch this space for news.

Update: I did some more tinkering with the security headers and I now also get a B rating from Yet Another Invaluable site: (The A rating seems quite tricky, but I’m looking at the requirements.)

Update#2: more tinkering, and now says “A+”! Yay.

Boom: the Return

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A few years ago I wrote a series of posts about Apple’s then-new Lightning connector for iOS devices:

No doubt you’re noticing a trend there… 🙂

Anyway, the recently-released iPad Pro seems to have the much-awaited USB3 capability on its Lightning connector. It does ship with a Lightning-to-USB2 cable, though, and USB3 capability isn’t mentioned in the tech specs.

The main objection to this actually happening is that Lightning, with its 8 pins, doesn’t have enough pins to support the standard USB 3 specification. This is, again, the old assumption that Lightning cables are “just… wires leading from one end to the other”.

To restate what I posted previously, if you actually look at the USB3 pinout, there are the two differential pairs which Lightning already has, and one additional pair for USB2 compatibility. So a legacy wire-to-wire USB3 cable would need 9 pins — but, remember, Lightning connectors don’t work that way!

In other words, if you plug in an old Lightning-to-USB2 cable into an iOS device, the cable itself already has to convert the two differential pairs to USB2’s single pair. So, no need to have the extra legacy pair on the Lightning connector itself — a future Lightning-to-USB3 cable will generate that as well, and use the two high-speed pairs when plugged into a USB3 peripheral. The current pinout is, therefore, quite sufficient.

A Tale of Two Certs


I’m keeping this post updated as details develop…

About ten days ago, something strange happened on my Mac: I was debugging the next version of my RB App Checker Lite app and suddenly I saw the dreaded dialog box:Damaged

Completely abnormal, especially as I was debugging using the Developer ID version (not the Mac App Store version!) from inside Xcode. When I opened Terminal, the same dialog; when I opened Safari, same thing! No new process was allowed to run. Of course I had to reboot to be able to do anything, everything worked fine afterwards, and I couldn’t reproduce the problem, so…

OK, a couple of days ago I concluded all was ready and I uploaded my app for review. A few hours after I announced so on Twitter, the reports began appear: the sky is falling! Major Mac App Store meltdown, everybody was getting the “damaged” dialog, Apple’s certificates were the culprit. I started testing my local apps from the MAS and, sure enough, the MAS leaf cert had expired; no problems, some of them asked anew for the AppleID password, some didn’t. RB App Checker Lite showed the expiration but no other problems, but I pulled it from review just in case.

Two days of confusion and frantic coding later, I had submitted (and pulled!) 4 more builds until I was reasonably sure that everything was working correctly. Thanks to several fellow developers on Twitter, the upcoming version seems to show everything correctly; it turned out that my receipt checks were somewhat obsolete. I usually publish the direct download version only after the MAS version has passed review, but decided to release version 1.1.4, build 351 immediately: you can get it here. It has a long list of improvements and fixes.

Meanwhile, the consensus is that rebooting and re-entering the AppleID and passwords (or even deleting and reinstalling) the affected apps solves 99% of the problems.

There are actually several different unfortunate problems here. First, the “damaged” dialog seems to be caused by some sort of cache or memory corruption in the system processes that coordinate to implement GateKeeper and the app store updates; some reports say killing the “storeagentd” process solves this problem without rebooting. (My system doesn’t seem to run this, FWIW.) What not everyone knows is that this dialog appears before the app it allowed to run; that is, it’s not affected by any checking done inside the app itself!

Second, asking for a new AppleID password. This is caused by the app itself checking the store receipt; something strongly recommended by Apple, since otherwise, it’s easy to copy a downloaded app to another computer and having it run there; I remember some early games not doing this and being widely pirated.

When an app is downloaded from the MAS, a proper receipt for that AppleID and that computer is already inside. A missing or corrupted receipt is the only normal circumstance in which the “damaged” dialog should appear. But if you copy the app to another computer, this will be noticed by the app itself.

Once a MAS app starts up, the first thing it should do is to check the receipt. It’s a complex process and not everybody implements it the same way. At first, checking the receipt’s cert chain would cause the receipt to be rejected in the case of expiration; the app exits with a special numeric code (exit 173) and this code signals the system to put up the dialog asking to confirm the purchaser’s AppleID and password. This, in turn, will cause a new receipt to be downloaded, and the app can now run with no problems. Update: reports indicate that, in at least some cases, the system doesn’t respond properly to exit 173.

A few years ago receipts began to include a new field containing the receipt’s creation date, and developers now had to check the certs against that date (and not against the current date), therefore obviating the need to reenter the password. Unfortunately this was not widely divulged, and Apple’s own sample code hasn’t yet been updated accordingly; I confess to not seeing this myself!

As is usual in disasters, several things have to go wrong at the same time: some bug corrupts a critical system cache, certificates expire normally, some apps incorrectly test for expiration, receipts are corrupted or the AppleID validation servers become slow or unreachable (because of the huge number of simultaneous requests), and… boom.

Many articles, unfortunately, published factual errors or wrong assumptions.Let’s try to counter a few:

  • Apple “allowed” their Mac App Store certificate to expire. Wrong on several levels. First, there’s not one but 5 (!) certificates involved in any app from the store: Apple’s root certificate: and 4 others: two intermediate and two leaf certificates.
    The way these certs work is by so-called certificate chains; every cert vouches for the lower-level ones. At the top is Apple’s Root certificate, which is one of a hundred or so in the System Keychain. There are two different certificate chains in every MAS app; the first is used in the code signature:and the second is used to sign the store receipt:Note the expired certificate there? This is a leaf certificate. These, usually, have a short life — one or two years — and the intermediate certificates usually last a little longer.
    So, when a cert expires, is that a serious problem? No – unless it is the root cert, which is why they all expire somewhen in the 2030s — hopefully, by that time, they’ll have figured out something better, Apple will have updated the cert via Software Update, or the horse will have learned to sing.
    The root cert can be updated via Software Update because it’s stored in System Keychain — but it’s impractical to push cert updates to each and every signed app, bundle or library; there are many thousands of them! So an expired cert in the code signature doesn’t affect the app at all. What’s important is that the certs were valid when the app was signed. When and if you get a new version of the app, all certs will probably be new ones. So there’s no “allowing” a leaf cert to expire — they do so naturally.
  • Apple “pushed” a new certificate that expires in 2035. This is probably just looking in the wrong place — not knowing which certificate had expired, someone glanced at the root certificate and noticed the “new” 2035 date. Nothing new to see, of course; that cert was created in 2006! Even more confusingly, someone else deduced from that that Apple let their original root cert expire; also wrong.
  • The system hasn’t been updated to check SHA2 (256) certificates. Wrong; it’s true that older systems used a version of the OpenSSL library that understood only SHA1 (128) certs, but that actually means 10.5 or so. Newer systems understand SHA2, and in any event, since the MAS went up, Apple has always recommended developers to not use the system’s OpenSSL library (I think it’s not even included anymore), so only very old apps would be affected by that.
    Update: Glenn Fleishman has informed me about the SSL situation: there’s the new 1.0.x library branch and the older 0.9.x branch. Both apparently got SHA2 support in 2010, when 1.0.0 and 0.9.8o came out, but some developers seem to have kept older versions, no doubt for valid reasons; space precludes, etc.
  • Apple is blaming developers. Apparently this can be traced to a single report of misinformation from an anonymous Apple Support person. As I write this, Apple hasn’t yet said anything; I doubt they’ll say anything over the weekend.
  • This is a serious security/cryptography failure.  Nope. This confusion arises from the fact that digital certificates (and libraries like OpenSSL)  are used for both secure, encrypted communications and for app/receipt signing. In the latter case, an expired cert doesn’t expose any information or makes the system or apps easier to hack.
  • Developers are better off not doing any, or little, receipt checking. Not really. True, apps which don’t do full receipt checking might have not been affected in this single instance, but under usual circumstances they’re more vulnerable to hacking or piracy.
  • Apple’s store/system infrastructure is brittle and can’t be trusted. True, it’s a very complex system that depends on many twisted little interlocking parts to work properly. And, as we’ve seen, this particular instance of failure is as self-amplifying as electrical grid failures _ once it starts, the demands on the working parts grow so huge that those fail, too. In Apple’s defense, it’s very hard to test for or simulate. Let’s hope that all involved have learned something from this incident; I certainly have learned a lot.

Update: forgot to comment on this particular post:

But when I tried to convince my Mac to run this app as an unsigned app, I encountered what is extremely likely to be the store DRM: I initially got the “your app was bought on another machine” message, so I tried deleting the receipt, but then I got the dreaded “app damaged” message, at which point I removed the signature.

…the only way I can see is to create a new root CA which I install on the machine as a trusted root, and redo the signing chain, and even that might not work if the DRM is somehow tied to the signature chain.

While I can understand the frustration implicit in not being able to run purchased apps “forever”, I think this is a fundamentally wrong approach. Let’s educate developers to check receipts properly, as I mentioned above. Figuring out a way to run store apps (or even developer-ID purchased apps) without “DRM” means that anyone else can use the same method to install pirated copies; we wouldn’t be able to trust users anymore.

Much worse, re-signing someone else’s app and expecting it to run is an even greater violation of trust. The days when you could hack someone’s app with ResEdit and having fun making it look different, or do unexpected things, are long gone. I implement very strict checks that my complete app bundle has not been altered in any way and that it’s running with my original signature, otherwise any user could freely alter files, hack the code, change graphic resources or even — and such cases have happened! — repost the app somewhere else as being their own. No, flawed as the current approach may be in implementation, I see no better alternative.

Update: reports are in from some helpful fellow developers, confirming my suspicions of cache corruption — RB App Checker Lite says the app bundle and receipt contents are OK, yet the apps will not run. I use the same APIs (hopefully) that the system processes use — but those APIs can take a long time to run, so the results are cached somewhere.

Update: Apple sent email to all developers:

In anticipation of the expiration of the old Mac App Store certificate, we issued a new certificate in September.

As I said — no “let[ting] certificates expire”. They all do.

We are addressing this caching issue in an upcoming OS X update.

Confirms this is a caching issue, as I suspected.

…some apps are running receipt validation code using very old versions of OpenSSL that don’t support SHA-2. We addressed this by replacing the new SHA-2 certificate with a new SHA-1 certificate last Thursday night.

I’m a little surprised that the number of apps using“very old versions” justifies going back to SHA1; but, OK.

Please ensure your code adheres to the Receipt Validation Programming Guide and check that all receipt validation issues are resolved.

Good, but:

  • the link goes to the page detailing the online receipt validation. Very few apps use that IMHO — you have to be online every time the app runs, you have to have a reasonably fast connection, and app launch will be significantly slower. Linking to this page (Validating Receipts Locally) would’ve been better;
  • it would have been more helpful to call out specifically the certificate expiration check and update the sample code to properly use the receipt creation date.

Update: I’ve now submitted rdar:///23611335 — a bug report to call attention to this documentation problem.

Update: Fixed the “Validating Receipts Locally” link, which was also pointing to the wrong page. Sorry. Also, here’s one way to do the correct date checking (copied from Matt Steven’s code):

X509_STORE *store;
// set up the store
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(param, time_from_receipt); // option 1: verify using a specific time
X509_STORE_set1_param(store, param);
// call PKCS7_verify() using configured store

As you may have seen elsewhere, Apple has just approved publication of RB App Checker Lite 1.1.3 (build 320) on the Mac App Store, and I’ve simultaneously published the Developer ID version (build 321) and updated the product page.

While the main focus of this version is to do some additional checks, fix bugs and display some information that users have requested, the XcodeGhost story broke just after I uploaded the first binary for review, and I had to remove it in order to see what RB App Checker Lite could do to detect this breach of security.

Assuming you’ve read the excellent summaries linked to in the previous paragraph, you may be interested in what I found inside the “ghosted” version of Xcode. Briefly, the hack alters the script Xcode uses to link an app’s binary; it also inserts look-alike versions of the CoreServices framework into the iOS, iPhone Simulator and OS X SDKs inside Xcode.

All this of course breaks Xcode’s code signature and, under normal circumstances, running such a hacked version would — after the customary delay for checking, 2 to 5 minutes — be detected by GateKeeper and it would advise the developer that “‘’ will damage your computer. You should move it to the Trash.” And the previous version of RB App Checker Lite would advise that “…requirements and resources didn’t pass static validation” and point at the changed file.

You’d think that that would take care of the matter, but it turns out that the affected developers turned GateKeeper off entirely, no doubt to get rid of the several minutes delay. After that, versions of their apps uploaded to the App Store would have been linked with a static library containing categories on Cocoa classes such as UIApplication, UIWindow and so forth; this static library having been hidden inside the added frameworks.

Needless to say, the new version of RB App Checker Lite also detects the added frameworks and warns: “3 frameworks are suspect: they use system names but are NOT signed by Apple!”.

This is both good and bad news. The good news is that this specific version of XcodeGhost — or any similar hack that hides code inside bogus frameworks looking like Apple’s frameworks — can be detected. The bad news is that this specific tactic depends on passing a casual visual inspection of the SDKs inside Xcode; in other words, the names and file paths used look reasonable and mostly duplicate Apple’s names and conventions.

This works because Xcode is a huge application; it contains nearly 5 thousand auxiliary executables. The latest Xcode beta has several SDKs for each of the 7 platforms it supports, and each SDK has an included instance of all system frameworks, both public and private, for that particular combination. Unfortunately, not all these frameworks are currently signed by Apple — only 2/3 of them are, and not in a consistent manner. (In all fairness, the percentage has been creeping up a little with each release.)

Therefore, unless you check the entire app contents with GateKeeper, RB App Checker Lite (or even the codesign command-line utility), it will be humanly impossible to pick out visually — by inspection in the Finder — if anything has been changed inside Xcode. So keep GateKeeper turned on! One suggestion Apple should implement is running GateKeeper tests for Apple-signed software even if GateKeeper has been deliberately disabled.

So, what to do about “infected” apps? Unfortunately the news is not good there. (By the way, I’m surprised that no infected apps were — as yet — found on the Mac App Store.) As I said, infected apps contain linked-in categories on Cocoa classes, using plausible English method names. Writing such categories is perfectly legal and even plausible — I’ve done so myself. Having code inside these categories do things that are allowed by the app’s entitlements, such as sending/receiving data over the net, is also perfectly legal and plausible. There seem to be some utilities out already that purport detecting such code, but I suppose they’d turn up a lot of false positives unless they check for these specific combinations of symbols — not very future-proof.

By the same token, Apple can’t really do these tests comprehensively when an app is uploaded to the store. They can and do check for private or “suspect” APIs being called, but as far as I can see the present XcodeGhost doesn’t use anything like that.

Coming back to RB App Checker Lite: it currently does NOT look inside executable code at all. Should it do so? I’m reluctant to implement that; it’s not clear what exactly to look for, regarding hacks like XcodeGhost, and it would mean that checking Xcode and similar huge apps would take tens of minutes or even more. I’m open to suggestions, however… comment here or email me!

Quay is now legacy

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If you’re a Quay user, there’s good and bad news.

The good news is, I finally had time to test it on OS X 10.11 (El Capitan) — not the final version, but the GM developer release — and it still works!

The bad news is, it works by coincidence and not fully. While I still use it myself on 10.10 (Yosemite), I don’t use all of its functions and it turns out that dragging a Finder saved search icon into the Dock stopped working some time in the past; they probably updated the format either in 10.10 or 10.9.

In 10.11 there are new security restrictions on 3rd-party applications getting information like memory and CPU usage of other processes; therefore, Quay’s popup for running applications will show only the application version.

Unfortunately, Quay is a 32-bit application that depends on now-obsolete Carbon APIs to do its magic, and these things are all going away. I can no longer compile it on current versions of Xcode, and OS X will Real Soon Now™ be 64-bit only.

My products page has been revised to show Quay as “legacy” software and I can no longer support it on newer systems or even promise that it will work at all on these. If you are a registered user, my apologies.

In other news, we were away for an extended trip to Eastern Europe and Asia. Here’s our updated world map:

worldmap2I also found time to work on RB App Checker Lite and a new version (1.1.3) is currently waiting for review on the App Store. Hopefully it will be out early in the week. More about this soon.

Watch Update

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Tomorrow (we suppose) the Apple Watch will be out. For months, there’s been lots of interesting documentation on Apple’s site — but it’s all about WatchKit, the framework used on the iPhone side to run “Watch” apps. Almost nothing about the Watch itself. I think most of my previous speculations were confirmed: specifically, the part about the Watch mostly being a remote display for the iPhone:

Perhaps… just a sequence of drawing orders? The important part is that there’ll be a single process on the Watch for doing the UI, and all the application-specific parts can be offloaded to the iPhone.

So, for now, the application logic will all be on the iPhone side — where the actual WatchKit part runs — and “assets”, meaning storyboards, xib files, and PNGs with pre-rendered icons, buttons and so forth, are downloaded to the Watch and displayed as needed. My back-of-the-napkins calculations about battery life (around 15 hours) still seem valid: Tim Cook said that you’d have to charge the Watch every night. I also said:

Watch OS … will not be a stripped-down iOS; maybe even not a Darwin derivative. It will be a highly optimized embedded system that runs as few processes as possible. It will be very robust because it will be able to do only a fixed set of functions.

Of course, this clashes with everybody else’s assumption that of course the Watch will be running iOS. Apple continues to be very careful about this: the OS that actually runs on the Watch is named nowhere that I could find. Likewise no hardware specs beyond the two screen’s pixel sizes were revealed. Details about the OS may not be revealed until next year, when developer apps supposedly may run on the device itself. It might make make sense for Apple to repurpose, say, the OS running on the smaller no-app iPods.

Beyond speculations about functionality, rumors have concentrated on price and updatability. I’m not competent to speculate about prices, but John Gruber’s final thoughts on the issue seem very reasonable.

Opinions are split on updatability, since few of Apple’s products can be upgraded, and none can have their hardware updated to a next generation. Then again, here’s a completely new type of product, smaller and (in some versions) more expensive than any other; it’s also, perhaps, the most personal Apple product ever. If you get an expensive Watch, say, as a graduation present — with an engraving, perhaps — you’ll be very reluctant to dispose of it and get a new one in a few years, even if the new version does much more.

At absolute minimum, the battery will have to be replaceable, and in my opinion, the entire Watch module (probably including the battery, probably excluding the display) will be upgradeable for a fee once a better version comes out — maybe not forever, but for at least 2 or 3 generations. We’ll see.

Updates update

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Good news: we’re back. Here’s my updated world map:

Bad news: my plans to work underway were largely derailed, and I had to wait an additional couple of weeks for my new iMac to arrive. Still, everything is finally installed and working now, and an update to RB App Checker Lite should be out in a day or two.

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